Popular Descriptions
Andersonville National Park
Life as a Prisoner
Castle Thunder Prison in Richmond VA
see also the recent book: George W. Alexander and Castle Thunder: A Confederate Prison and Its Commandant by Frances H. Casstevens (2004)
Finding specific Information:
Civil War Research Database search for individual soldiers
How to Order Civil War Records
The National Archives has most of the prison records. Write them at inquire@arch2.nara.gov
Phone # of Civil and Old Military reference staff=202-501-5385
Address-
National Archives Civil & Old Military Records
700 Pennsylvania Ave NW, room 13W
Washington,D.C. 20408
If you know his name and unit, POW status should be in his "military service
record"--also at the National Archives in DC.
For Andersonville prisoners, look at the
cd-rom
Rhodes 1904 History
Editors' note: the treatment of captured prisoners was highly charged emotionally and politically during and after the Civil War. Both sides used atrocity stories to further their political goals. During Reconstruction and as late as the 1880s, politicians "waved the bloody shirt" to stir up hatred of the other section, and most often they reminded voters of the atrocities committed against prisoners of war. James Ford Rhodes was a Yankee historian on the 1890s best known for his meticulous research and his ability to move beyond sectional hatred. His analysis is a secondary source and it remains one of the clearest and least polemical. We have hot-linked most of Rhodes' sources. Page numbers in [brackets] refer to the 1920 edition. The maps and graphics included here were added by the editor and are not in the Rhodes book. We have used the 1920 reprint of the 1904 book; a copy is in many public and college libraries.
James Ford
Rhodes
History of the United States of America:
From the Compromise of 1850 to the McKinley-Bryan Campaign of 1896
Vol 5:
1864-1866 Chapter XXIX
New York: Macmillan, 1904; 1920 edition
copyright has expired; this is a public domain
document
Introduction
I [Rhodes] have reserved for a separate chapter the consideration of the
treatment of the prisoners of war and some cognate topics. No
subject is so difficult of discussion between Southern and
Northern men as that suggested by the word "Andersonville."
Military strategy and tactics in all of the battles are discussed
in a calm spirit; the merits and faults of Confederate and Union
generals are impartially weighed; political and social questions
are taken up as if they were a century rather than lithe more
than a generation old; even the emancipation of the Negro is
examined with candour by Southern writers and the devastation of
territory though often still arousing indignation can be talked
or written about without loss of temper. For arriving at the
truth about the treatment of the prisoners of war the materials
are ample and the time has come when this subject should be
considered with an even mind.(1) The publication of series ii. of
the Official Records brings to light new evidence and arranges
the old in proper juxtaposition. Though the United States
government is a party to the case, the accomplished editors of
the War Department have printed the letters and documents
acquired largely through their industrious research, wholly with
the view to ascertain the truth no matter which side it should
favour. Acting thus in the true historic spirit they have
recognized the right of South as well as North to a share in the
literary property of the United States; and the historical
student who emulates their industry and impartiality will be able
to present an accurate relation of the treatment of the prisoners
of war. The material is enormous and a year were none too much
for an exact and comprehensive study of it....
(1) I do not mean to imply that the subject has not
been impartially treated. Certainly I cannot hope to do better
than Professor Rufus B. Richardson has done in his article on
Andersonville in the New Englander for November, 1880. I possess,
however, the advantage over him of the convenient arrangement o!
the important material to which he had access and of the new
material which if brought to light in series ii of the Official
Records. There may be other impartial disquisitions that deserve
the high praise to which Professor Richardson's paper is
entitled, but I do not happen to know them. The second-hand
material which I have read, except Professor Richardson's, has
been entirely polemical. Rufus B. Richardson, "Andersonville,"New Englander Nov. 1880.
In this mass of material the man with a preconceived notion can
find facts to his liking. If he desire to prove that the Union
prisoners at the South were badly treated and that the
Confederate prisoners at the North were dealt with in "a noble,
magnanimous manner"(1) he will find evidence to support his
proposition; he will be able to adduce Southern testimony
sustaining both parts of his thesis. If on the other hand he
desire to show the reverse, that the cruelty was at the North and
the kindness at the South he can bring forward Northern testimony
in support of his view. A shrewd advocacy of either of those
preconceived notions may be all the more insidious when supported
by evidence from the enemy fairly presented; the apparent proof
may them be made stronger by garbled quotations from the same
source; and to clinch the argument an overpowering mass of
testimony may be adduced from the side whose cause he has
espoused. Contemporary statements of those who suffered may be
found in profusion and systematic presentations of one argument
or the other may be read in papers of high Confederate or Union
officials and committees of Congress especially empowered for the
investigation of the subject. In no part of the history of the
Civil War is a wholesome skepticism more desirable and nowhere is
more applicable a fundamental tenet of historical criticism that
all the right is never on one side and all the wrong on the
other.
(1) Report of a commission of inquiry appointed by
the U. S. Sanitary Commission, p. 96. Online are: Extracts from the Minutes of Proceedings of the Standing Committee of the United States Sanitary Commission...1864
and
Appendix to the Report of the Sanitary Commission (1864).
Prisoners Exchanged at Start of War
Prisoners began to be taken in 1861; and in 1862 great numbers
were captured by both armies. Had the war been one between two
nations the procedure would have been simple. Exchanges would at
once have been made. But here the question was complicated by the
North desiring to avoid recognizing in any way the Confederate
government while the Confederate agents endeavoured to entrap the
Northern representatives into some such recognition. At first the
Confederacy held the greater number of prisoners but after the
capture of Fort Donelson that balance fell to the side of the
North and as one of the points made was that the excess remaining
over the actual exchanges should be paroled, each side changed
its attitude conformably to its immediate interest. A good deal
of fencing, a natural concomitant of the situation, went on which
finally resulted July 22, 1862 in the arrangement of a cartel
between Generals Dix and D. H. Hill under which with only brief
interruptions exchanges went on until December 28 1862 when
Secretary Stanton ordered the discontinuance of the exchange of
commissioned officers. (1) This action was due to a proclamation
of Jefferson Davis issued five days previously declaring Benjamin
F. Butler "a felon deserving of capital punishment" for having
(1) O. R., series iii. vol. v. p.128.
[page 486]
executed William B. Mumford in New Orleans (1) and
ordering that no commissioned officer be released on parole until
Butler had been punished for "his crimes." Davis further
declared that all commissioned officers serving under Butler were
"robbers and criminals" and if captured should be reserved for
execution. Taking up the Negro question which now became a part
of the controversy owing to Lincoln's proclamation of
emancipation of September 22, 1862 and the attempts to enlist
Negro soldiers he decreed that "all Negro slaves captured in
arms" and their white officers should be delivered over to the
respective States of the Confederacy to be dealt with according
to their laws (2) they could thus be proceeded against under the
rigorous statutes relating to Negro insurrections.
(1) Mumford hauled down the U. S. flag which had been
raised upon the U. S. Mint by Farragut, "dragged it through the
streets and tore it in shreds." He was executed June 7, 1862.
Butler to Stanton, June 10, OR, series ii. vol. iii. p. 673 .
(2) Ibid., vol. v. p.
795.
Special exchanges however went on for a while under an extra-
cartel method but these were stopped May 25, 1863 by an order of
General Halleck, this order being probably an answer to the joint
resolution of the Confederate Congress defining the status of
Negroes in arms and their white officers who might be captured.
(3) The declaration by the Confederate commissioner that a large
portion of the prisoners captured and paroled by General Grant at
Vicksburg were to be regarded as having been exchanged and that
the Confederate government did not recognize the paroles at Port
Hudson interjected another difficulty. Both points were contested
by the Union authorities and a long and voluminous correspondence
full of mutual recrimination followed together with many ex-parte
statements and report.
(3) Ibid., p, 696; vol. vi. pp. 136, 647.
The joint resolution of the Confederate Congress, approved May 1,
1863, declared, "That every white person being a commissioned
officer. . . who shall command Negroes or mulattoes in arms against
the Confederate States. . . shall be deemed as inciting servile insurrection,
and shall if captured be put to death or be otherwise punished at the
discretion of the Court." A final section provided that
the Negroes captured should be delivered to the authorities of the
States to be dealt with according to their present or future laws.
Statutes at Large, Confederate States. See correspondence between
Generals Grant and Taylor, O. R., vol. xxiv. part i. pp. 425, 443,
469, also pp. 589, 590.
Conditions in 1863
Thus in 1863 a large number of prisoners were held by each
side. The prisons at the North were overcrowded(1) The
arrangements for getting rid of the faeces were defective, the
supply of water was often short, bathing facilities hardly
existed, the ventilation left much to be desired and the drainage
was bad. The policing was imperfect, vermin abounded. Filth is
the word most frequently met with in the descriptions of the
prisons. Some of the commandants were inefficient, others were
intemperate. In the winter the prisoners suffered from the cold
and on the still-remembered bitter day of January 1, 1864 when it
is said the mercury at Johnson's Island, Ohio went down to 25 degrees
below zero and at Camp Morton, Indianapolis to 20 below the suffering
was acute. But they had an abundance of food and everywhere the
shelter of barracks, except at Point Lookout where tents were
provided.(2) Clothing and blankets were furnished them and stoves
were put up in the barracks. The orders were that they should be
supplied with the same rations as soldiers in the army but as it
was not expected that they would consume so much, the value of
articles that could be withheld conveniently constituted a
"prison fund," out of which eatables conducive to the health of
the captives and not included in the army ration were to be
purchased. Prisoners who had money were permitted to buy food and
clothing and sympathizing relatives and friends at the North sent
boxes of these articles which under certain restrictions as to
clothing were delivered to the men for whom they were intended.
(1) Confederate prisoners were held at Camp Douglas,
Chicago, Camp Butler, Springfield, Ill., Camp Morton,
Indianapolis, Camp Chase, Columbus, Johnson's Island, Ohio (set
apart for officers); also at Elmira, N.Y., Rock Island and Alton,
Ill., and St. Louis, Point Lookout, Maryland, and Fort Delaware, Del.
(2) At other places the tents were temporary makeshifts.
map of all camps; Andersonville = #8
In 1863 the Union prisoners were for the most part confined in
tobacco houses in Richmond, Libby being [page 488] chiefly
devoted to officers, and on Belle Isle an island in the James
River. Filth, vermin and generally unsanitary conditions
prevailed; but the Richmond prisons were well supplied with water
and at Libby there were bath-rooms, although there was a lack of
soap. The ventilation was good. At Belle Isle there was no
shelter but tents and not nearly enough tents to go round. The
intention of the Confederate government was to furnish the
prisoners the ration of their army but it sometimes failed and
they as well as soldiers and citizens were a prey to the pangs of
hunger. Those who had money were allowed to buy food in the
market. It was impossible to supply bedding and clothing in any
needed quantity and from the lack of these and sufficient fuel
the winter's cold was hard to endure. For a while boxes of food,
clothing and blankets were with the consent of the Confederate
authorities sent from the North to the prisoners by the Federal
government, by the Sanitary and Christian Commissions and by
private parties. The clothing and blankets reached those for whom
they were designed but not all of the food, much of which was
eaten by hungry Confederates, although there was no authorized
embezzlement.
Complaints of Maltreatment
Mutterings in the North against the Confederacy
for the treatment of their prisoners of war began in 1862
developing the next year into systematic complaints. It was
reported that the exchanged or paroled Union prisoners who
arrived at Annapolis were generally "in a state of extreme
destitution, with lithe or no clothing and that covered with
filth and vermin. They are often physically emaciated and
suffering from hunger and disease." (1) (1) March 3,
1863, O. R., series ii. vol. v. p. 328; see also pp. 396, 478,
487.
The dissemination of such reports was met by the Southerners with
counter complaints. "You take away the health and strength of
Confederate soldiers," wrote Robert Ould, the Confederate agent
of exchange to the Union officer holding a like position. "You
your self see the living wrecks which come from Fort Delaware -
men who went into that cruel keep hale and robust, men inured to
almost every form of hardship and proof against everything except
the regimen of that horrible prison." (1) "Can nothing be done,"
Ould again asks, "to stop the fearful mortality at Fort Delaware? Is
it intended to fill our land with mourning by such means of subjugation?"(2)
The other side is shown in the report of an
assistant surgeon of the United States army touching 189 sick and
wounded prisoners who were received at City Point from Belle Isle
and destined for Annapolis. "Every case," he wrote, "wore upon
it the visage of hunger, the expression of despair and exhibited
the ravages of some preying disease within or the wreck of a once
athletic frame. . . . Their hair was dishevelled, their beards
long and matted with dirt, their skin blackened and caked with
the most loathsome filth, and their bodies and clothing covered
with vermin. Their frames were in the most cases all that was
left of them. A majority had scarcely vitality sufficient to
enable them to stand." Eight died on the passage to Annapolis and
twenty-seven more soon after their arrival.(3) Stanton in his
report to the President of December 5, 1863 said that the
Confederate prisoners of war had been "treated with the utmost
humanity and tenderness consistent with security," while the
Union soldiers held captive at the South "were deprived of
shelter, clothing and food and some have perished from exposure
and famine." In his opinion this "savage barbarity" had been
practised to force the Union government to the plan of exchange
desired by the Confederate.
(1) July 13, 1863, O. R., series ii. vol. vi. p.113.
(2) Ibid., p.181.
(3) Nov. 2, 1862, ibid., pp. 474, 475. 490
On the other hand Jefferson Davis said in his message to his
Congress December 7, 1863 that the "odious treatment of our
officers and soldiers" had constrained the United States
authorities, in order to shield themselves, to make misstatements
"such as that the prisoners held by us are deprived of food."
They are given, he asserted, the same rations "in quantity and
quality as those served out to our own gallant soldiers in the
field which has been found sufficient to support them in their
arduous campaigns." Indeed, he continued, we have been indulgent
in allowing them to be supplied by their friends at home with
comforts superior to those enjoyed by their captors while "the
most revolting inhumanity has characterized the conduct of the
United States towards prisoners held by them." (1) At this stage
of the controversy the crowning argument so far as concerned the
effect on Northern public sentiment was presented by the
Committee on the Conduct of the War who were requested by Stanton
in May, 1864 to "examine with their own eyes" some prisoners at
Annapolis who had been returned from Belle Isle. With the usual
partisan report fortified by the usual ghastly details they sent
out photographs of eight of the men, seven of whom in a naked or
partly naked condition were taken sitting up, while the eighth
apparently from extreme weakness was reclining in bed. The
emaciation of the bodies and woebegone expression of the faces
were horrible.(2)
(1) O. R,., series ii. vol. vi. p. 679.
(2) Report No. 67, 38th Cong. 1st Session
What I have cited illustrates the spirit in which this question
was approached from each side. The statements of those in
authority must be regarded as partisan documents issued for the
purpose of swaying public sentiment in the hottest campaign ever
fought in America. This view does not imply that Davis and
Stanton were insincere, for the native vindictiveness of these
men and their intense devotion to their respective causes
impelled them to believe any evil of their enemies and discredit
any good. The feeling ran so high that [page 491] under officials
were unconsciously affected and read into their observations and
reports their own preconceived notions. The surgeons in their
diagnoses were hardly governed by sectional animosity but when
they speculated on causes, they ascribed to bad treatment ills
that may well have had another origin. There was no intention on
either side to maltreat the prisoners. A mass of men had to be
cared for unexpectedly. Arrangements were made in a hurry and, as
neither side expected a long duration of the war, they were only
makeshifts devised with considerable regard for economy in
expenditure. There was bad management at the North and still
worse at the South owing to a less efficient organization with
meagre resources. And it plainly appears from the mass of the
evidence that the prisoner at the North was the better off of the
two as he had always food and shelter. All testimony is
concurrent that there is no torture equal in intensity to the
fierce longing for food and this was often the lot of the captive
Union soldier. The condition of many was aggravated after
December 11, 1863 when the Confederates for what they deemed
valid reasons refused to receive provisions and clothing sent
from the North for the Federal prisoners.(1) (1) O.
R., series ii. vol. vi. p. 686.
Had the war ended with the year 1863, the treatment of poisoners
North and South could have been considered dispassionately with
substantial agreement in the conclusions of candid inquirers. To
the refusal to exchange prisoners and to threatened retaliation
by the North and to Andersonville at the South are due for the
most part the bitterness which has been infused into this
controversy.
Andersonville
The Confederate government appreciated that it was impossible
to feed their prisoners if retained in Richmond and on Belle Isle
and from time to time they sent some of them to places farther
south. In November, [page 492] 1863 an order was issued for the
establishment of a prison in Georgia, the granary of the eastern
part of the Confederacy, and for this purpose a tract of land was
selected near the town of Andersonville. A stockade 15 feet high
enclosing 16 1/2 acres was built and this in June, 1864 was
enlarged to 26 1/2 acres but 3 1/4 acres near the centre was too
marshy to be used. A small stream ran through the enclosure which
it was thought would furnish water sufficient for drinking and
for bathing. The trees within the stockade were cut down and no
shelter was provided for the expected inmates, who began to
arrive in February, 1864 before the rude prison was completed
according to the design and before an adequate supply of bacon
for their use had been received. Prisoners continued to come
until on the 5th of May there were about 12,000 which number went
on increasing until in August it exceeded 32,000: their condition
was one of extreme wretchedness. Those who came first erected
rude shelters from the debris of the stockade; later arrivals
burrowed in the ground or protected themselves with any blankets
or pieces of cloth of which they had not been deprived according
to the practice of robbing men who were taken prisoners, which
prevailed on both sides. Through an unfortunate location of the
baking and cooking houses on the creek above the stockade the
water became polluted before it reached the prisoners, so that to
obtain pure water they must dig wells. After a severe storm a
spring broke out within the enclosure and this became one of the
main reliances for drinking water. The sinks were constructed
over the lower part of the stream but the current was not swift
enough to carry away the ordure, and when the stream was swollen
by rain and overflowed the faecal matter was deposited over a
wide area producing a horrible stench. This was the famous prison
of Andersonville.
Worse suffering still came from the pangs of hunger. It was
the intention of the authorities to issue the same ration to the
prisoners as to the soldiers in the field, viz. one-third of a
pound of pork, one and a quarter pounds of corn meal and
occasionally beans, rice and molasses. The meal was issued
unbolted and when baked made a coarse and unwholesome bread. At
times provisions ran short. On July 25, 1864 General John H.
Winder, the commandant telegraphed to Adjutant General Cooper:
"There are 29,400 prisoners, 2650 troops, 500 Negroes and other
laborers and not a ration at the post." He further expressed the
opinion that there should be at least ten days' rations kept on
hand.(1) This despatch was submitted to the commissary-general
who reported that Lee's and Hood's armies were largely dependent
upon Georgia for their supplies; that he had no money either to
buy or impress provisions; and that when Lee's army was but a
day's ration ahead it was unreasonable to think of providing a
ten days' store for the prisoners.(2) Sometimes the food was
stolen by the Confederates or by the detailed prisoners who had
charge of its distribution. Even when there was sufficient food
at the post cooking utensils and facilities for distribution were
lacking. Captain Henry Wirz the "Captain commanding prison" reported that at
least 8000 men in the stockade must be deprived of their "rations of rice, beans, vinegar and molasses" because of the lack
of buckets.[3] To supplement the cooking houses the raw food was
turned over to some of the prisoners who were ill provided with
wood as well as utensils for its proper preparation. When the
quantity was sufficient its quality afforded but harsh nutriment
to the Northern soldier accustomed to the generous rations of his
own government. It is entirely comprehensible that the Southern
man should have marched long and fought well on his accustomed
fare of "hog and hominy "from which the hungry and sick
prisoner at Andersonville sometimes turned with disgust used as
he had been to fresh meat, wheaten bread and coffee.
(1) O. R., ser. ii. vol. vii. p. 499.
(2) Ibid.
(3) June 6, 1864, ibid., p. 207.
Thus insufficiently nourished, exposed by day to the fierce
southern sun, by night to dews, drenched with torrential rains,
languishing amidst filth and stench, breathing polluted air,
homesick depressed desperate, these men were an easy prey to the
diseases of diarrhoea, dysentery, scurvy and gangrene. Owing to
their "depraved blood," "a pin scratch, a prick of a splinter, an
abrasion or even a mosquito bite" would cause gangrenous ulcers;
and these also were caused by vaccination, which was ordered when
smallpox made its appearance in the prison.(1) The hospital was
originally located within the stockade but a brief trial showed
this plan to be a fatal mistake and it was moved outside and
placed by a stream under a grove of trees. But it was inadequate
to accommodate all who were sick and hundreds of men who were
unable to find room in the hospital died in the stockade. The
physicians for the most part seem to have been honest and humane
but even if they had been skilful they could have accomplished
little in the absence of a proper diet, bedding and medicines for
the sick. Andersonville was in the words of the Confederate
surgeon Joseph Jones a "gigantic mass of human misery."
Nearly one-third of the captives died within seven months (2)
and the human wrecks who finally reached home caused an
impression which must be reckoned with in any account of Northern
public sentiment after the end of the war. (1) Report
of Assistant Surgeon Thornburgh (Confederate), O. R., ser. ii.
vol. viii. p. 626.
(2) Jones wrote Oct.19, 1864: "Since the establishment of
this prison on the 24th of February, 1864, over 10,000 Federal
prisoners have died; that in near one-third of the entire number
have perished in less than seven months." -Ibid., vol. vii.
p.1012.
Andersonville, drawn by prisoner
To form an estimate of the horrors of Andersonville it is not
necessary to go beyond Southern contemporaneous [page 495]
testimony. As early as April 17, 1864 Adjutant General Cooper
had from thence the report of a "frightful mortality." (1) On
May 5 Howell Cobb wrote to him that the prison was "already too
much crowded"; that if the number of prisoners were increased
without enlargement of the prison these would be "a terrific
increase of sickness and deaths during the summer months." The
prison was enlarged and might then with some regard to sanitary
conditions have accommodated 10,000 but the mighty duel going on
between Lee and Grant was constantly giving the Confederacy many
new captives. These were sent to Andersonville; where on August
12, 1864 the number of prisoners reached 32,911.(2) They must
have shelter or "they will die of by hundreds" is the word which
had reached Cooper by the end of May. (4) Captain Wirz pleaded
that the meal for the prisoners be bolted; the bread which it
makes, he wrote, consists "fully of one-sixth of husk, is almost
unfit for use" increasing as it does "dysentery and other bowel
complaints." (5) Again on August (1) Captain Wirz wrote: "The
prison although a large addition has been made is too crowded;
almost daily large numbers of prisoners arrive; all internal
improvements. . . will come to a dead halt for the want of room.
As long as 30,000 men are confined in any one enclosure the
proper policing is altogether impossible. A long confinement has
depressed the spirits of thousands and they are utterly
indifferent."
(1) O. R., ser. ii. vol. vii. p. 63.
(2) Ibid., p. 593.
(4) Ibid., p. 168.
(5) June 7, 1884, ibid., p. 207.
The most important document is the report of Colonel D. T.
Chandler made on August 5, 1864 to the authorities in Richmond
subsequent to an inspection of the prison. After a graphic
description of the place and a statement of the disabilities
under which the prisoners lay he said:
"There are and can be no regulations established for the
police consideration for the health, comfort and sanitary condition of those within the
enclosure and none are practicable under existing
circumstances. . . . Numbers have been found murdered by their
comrades and, in their desperate efforts to provide for their own
safety a court organized among themselves, by authority of
General Winder, granted on their own application, has tried a
large number of their fellow-prisoners and sentenced six to be
hung which sentence was duly executed by themselves within the
stockade with the sanction of the post-commander. . . . The crowd
at [sick-call] is so great that only the strongest can get access
to the doctors, the weaker ones being unable to force their way
through the press. . . . Many -- twenty yesterday -- are carted out
daily who have died from unknown causes and whom the medical
officers have never seen. The dead are hauled out daily by the
wagon load arid buried without coffins. . . . The sanitary
condition of the prisoners is as wretched as can be. . . . The
arrangements for cooking and baking have been wholly inadequate.
Raw rations have to be issued to a very large proportion" who
lack proper cooking utensils and do not have a sufficient supply
of fuel. ". . . The rate of deaths has steadily increased from
37.4 per 1000 during the month of March last to 62.7 per 1000
in July."
Colonel Chilton the official in Richmond to whom this
report was immediately made indorsed on it, "The condition of
the prison at Andersonville is a reproach to us as a nation." He
took it to Judge Campbell who writing on the back of it, "These
reports show a condition of things at Andersonville which calls
very loudly for the interposition of the Department in order that
a change may be made," carried it to the Secretary of War, but
according to some Southern testimony it was never seen by
Davis.(1)
(1) For Chandler's report and the indorsement, see
O. R., ser. ii. vol. vii. pp. 546-551. Two reports of the chief
surgeon were submitted with it, pp. 524, 541. Winder, Wirz and
some other officers at Andersonville attempted to traverse
Chandler's statements, ibid., p. 755 et seq. Chilton was of the
opinion that Chandler's report was entirely truthful. No doubt
can now be entertained of the complete accuracy of that which I
have cited in the test and the substantial accuracy of the whole
report. Chandler seems to have been a gentleman of high
character. For the authority for the other statements, see
Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. i. p.198 et seq.
In consequence of the overcrowding of Andersonville and in
response to Winder's recommendation, the Secretary of War by the
order of Davis had already authorized the establishment of a new
prison to which a number of these captives should be removed. (1)
A camp five miles from Millen, Georgia was selected and a
stockade prison was planned, but as the material, tools and labor
had to be impressed and funds were short the work went on slowly
and the new prison was not ready until about October 1. In the
meantime the capture of Atlanta (September 1, 1864) by Sherman
had compelled the abandonment of Andersonville. All the prisoners
who were not too sick to be moved were sent to Savannah and
Charleston. These cities could not care for so many and those at
Charleston were sent to Florence (S.C.) and those at Savannah to
Millen as soon as it was ready. Millen was a large prison and
never crowded, and although food was scarce the arrangements were
in other respects fairly good. It was occupied for only a brief
period, Sherman's march to the sea compelling its abandonment,
and the sending of the prisoners back to Andersonville where
owing to altered conditions the misery of the summer was never
repeated. Florence (S.C.) and Salisbury (N.C.) (whither a large
number of captives were sent in November) reproduced the worst
phases of Andersonville but the commandants and other officials
endeavoured to alleviate the sufferings of the men, failing for
the most part from lack of means.
(1) Winder, July 26, Seddon, Aug. 5, O. R., ser.
ii. vol. vii. pp. 493, 546. The date of the indorsement (p. 550)
indicate that Seddon had not seen Chandler's report when he
issued this authorization, but Chandler afterwards expressed the
opinion that his report resulted in much benefit to the
prisoners, ibid., vol. viii. p. 527.
The Exchange of Prisoners
[page 498] The importance of Andersonville lies in the
question, How far may the Confederate government be held
responsible for its horrors? An important consideration in
coming to a conclusion in this matter is the position they took
in regard to the exchange of prisoners. Whatever may be the right
or wrong of the previous controversy the fact stands out clearly
that in 1864 the Confederate authorities were eager to make
exchanges, their interest being on the side of humanity. In 1863
the status of Negro prisoners and white officers of Negro
regiments had been one of the obstacles, Stanton having asserted
that these men must be protected by the exaction for them of
equal rights. The Negro question had a moral side of importance
and furnished an excellent argument for the Washington government
if it were desired to avoid exchanges but practically it was of
comparatively little moment. There were very few Negro captives
and with rare exceptions they were not abused. The Union had an
excess of prisoners and as the sequel proved the Negroes were
well protected by Lincoln's threat of retaliation.(1) In fact
owing to the pressure of public sentiment at the North during
1863, which was fostered by the reports of ill treatment of
Federal prisoners, and the known readiness of the Confederate
government to continue exchanges under the cartel, the United
States War Department made at the end of the year a proposition
which left the Negroes out of the case. Halleck offered to Lee a
man to man exchange for the captives in Richmond.(2) Lee perhaps
technically correct but really short-sighted refused this offer
insisting upon the cartel which required the Federal
government to release on parole their excess of prisoners.
(1) Proclamation of July 30, 1863.
(2) Dec. 7,
1863, O. R., ser. ii. vol. vi. p. 659.
As the campaign of 1864 was about to open and the great need of
soldiers at the South was painfully apparent the Confederate
government receded from one of [page 499] their positions and
expressed their willingness to treat free Negroes and white
officers of coloured troops as prisoners of war although they
still contended that former slaves should be returned to their
masters. But now Grant was in command and although others saw a
clearly as he that the South must be subjugated, he it was whose
iron nerve was equal to carrying out remorselessly the policy of
subjugation. On April 17, 1864 he ordered that not another
Confederate prisoner of war should be paroled or exchanged until
there were released a sufficient number of Union officers and men
to equal the paroles at Vicksburg and Port Hudson and unless
furthermore the Confederate authorities would agree to make no
distinction whatever between white and coloured prisoners.(1)
These were subterfuges. In the previous November he had ignored
the alleged breach of faith concerning the Vicksburg paroles; (2)
moreover as long as the North had the excess of prisoners she
held
??
s gage for the former slaves who had volunteered to fight
for the freedom of their race; and according to a letter of
General Stoneman and two other officers from their prison in
Charleston the condition of these Negro soldiers who were again
made slaves was "happiness compared with the cruel existence "of
the prisoners at Andersonville.(3) (1) O. R, ser. ii.
vol. vii. p. 62 .
[2] ??
(3) 14, 1864, ibid., vol. vii.
p. 617.
(4) Ibid., pp. 578, 705.
On August 10, 1864 the Confederate government proposed to
exchange officer for officer and man for man, accompanying their
communication with a statement of the mortality at
Andersonville.(4) This offer with the great pressure on
Washington to effect the release of the Northern soldiers (whose
sufferings seemed unnecessary for the protection of the former
slaves) forced Grant to declare the real reason of his policy.
"It is hard on our men held in Southern prisons not to exchange them," [page 500] he wrote from City Point, "but it is humanity to those left in the ranks to fight our battles. Every man we
hold, when released on parole or otherwise, becomes an active
soldier against us at once either directly or indirectly. If we
commence a system of exchange which liberates all prisoners
taken, we will have to fight on until the whole South is
exterminated. If we hold those caught they amount to no more than
dead men. At this particular time to release all rebel prisoners
North would insure Sherman's defeat and would compromise our
safety here." (1) (1) Aug.18, 1864, O. R., ser. ii.
vol. vii. p. 607; see also vol. viii. p. 811.
Despite the many influences brought to bear upon Lincoln, some of
which were political he stood by his general and Grant had his
way. On October 1, 1864 Lee proposed to Grant a man-to-man exchange
for the prisoners of their armies. Will you deliver the coloured
troops "the same as white soldiers?" Grant asked in reply.
"Negroes belonging to our citizens are not considered subjects of
exchange," returned Lee. I therefore "decline making the
exchanges you ask" was the rejoinder of Grant.(1) Less than four
months later (January 24, 1865) the Confederate government
reiterate their offer of an exchange of man for man and this was
then accepted by Grant who undoubtedly foresaw the imminent
collapse of the Confederacy. (1) O.R.,
vol. vii. pp. 906, 909, 914. While the
South is entitled to credit for her concessions in order to
effect exchanges, the local management and the Richmond
government may be justly charged with negligence in not providing
shelter for the prisoners at Andersonville. The prison was in a
wooded region and the captives should have been set to work under
parole to build for themselves log huts or clapboard dwellings as
they were afterwards at Florence.(2)
(2) The erection of barracks by prisoners when
practicable, was also ordered for Elmira, New York, ibid. , vol.
vii. p. 918.
[page 501] A Southern defence against this charge is that the men
at Andersonville, who were all private soldiers and
noncommissioned officers, were of such bad character that they
could not be trusted to keep their pledge; indeed some who went
outside on parole broke it and escaped. That many of the
prisoners were outcasts is true. A large number of then were of
the bounty-jumping class(1) who, prevented from desertion by the
vigorous discipline of Grant, allowed themselves to be taken
captive in the May and June battles about Richmond: the accessions
during the summer of 1864 came largely from Grant's army. The
thefts and murders committed by these miscreants resulted, as we
have seen, in the banding together of the better sort and the
trial and execution of six culprits. But it would have been easy
for the prison commandants to discriminate; the prisoners from
Belle Isle and Sherman's army were in the main worthy of
confidence and a wise and humane management would have taken
account of this and bettered the condition of the men without
incurring the risk of their escape. (1) Thieves, pickpockets, and
vagabonds would enlist, take whatever bounty was paid in
cash, desert when opportunity offered, change their names, go
to another district or State, re-enlist, collect another bounty,
desert again, and go on playing the same trick until they were
caught, or until such chances of gain were no longer available.
see Rhodes, History vol. iv. p. 431;
New York Times, Jan. 6, 1865 , page 4 col. 3, cited by R. B. Richardson, New Englander, Nov.1880,
p. 756.
When the Confederate government perceived that they could
neither feed their prisoners nor properly care for them and when
their effort to secure exchanges had failed they should have
paroled the captive soldiers under the most solemn oath and sent
them North. This is not merely a utopian idea conceived after the
event. Vice-President Stephens urged such a plan on Howell Cobb
who as major-general of the Georgia Reserves had a supervision of
the Andersonville prisoners.(2) Cobb did not adopt this view in
its entirety but suggested to Seddon that all the men who were
opposed to the election of Lincoln should be paroled and sent
home.(3) (2) Stephens, The War between the States, vol. ii.
p. 516.
(3) Sept. 9, 1864, O. R., ser. ii. vol. vii. p. 796.
[page 502] A "poor man" from Georgia wrote thus to Jefferson
Davis: "Please read the sixth chapter of Second Kings. Follow
the example of the King of Israel. Send the prisoners at
Andersonville home on their parole. Send them home before the
cold proves more destructive of their lives than the heat has
been in the open and unshaded pen your officers provided for
them. It will prove the greatest victory of the war and do our
cause more good than any three victories our noble troops have
gained." (1) An indorsement on this letter would appear to
indicate that the advice therein had been considered by Davis and
his private secretary, Burton N. Harrison. The "poor man" made a
mistake in his chapter meaning instead the twenty-eighth of
Second Chronicles.(2) This is noted by Harrison as he wrote
"Respectfully referred by direction of the President to the Secretary of War."(3)
A prominent citizen of South Carolina
advised the paroling of the prisoners as a matter of policy and
mercy (4) and even General John H. Winder urged at two different
times that the men held captive at Florence be paroled and sent
home; and in this recommendation he was supported by the Governor
of South Carolina and by General Chesnut (5)
(1) Sept. 7, 1864, O. R., ser. ii. vol. vii. p.
783.
(2) "The children of lsrael carried away captive of their
brethren [of Judah] two hundred thousand. . . . But a prophet of
the Lord said 'Deliver the captives again. . . for the fierce
wrath of the Lord is upon you.'. . . and the men rose up and took
the captives and. . . clothed all that were naked. . . and shod
them and gave them to eat and to drink and anointed them and
carried all the feeble of them upon asses and brought them to
Jericho to their brethren."
(3) The indorsement is dated Sept. 14 .
(4) Sept. 21, 1864, O. R., ser. ii. vol. vii. p. 855. The
letter containing this advice was forwarded to Seddon.
(5) The second time, in a despatch to Cooper, Jan. 20, 1865, O.
R., ser. ii. vol. viii. p. 96.
That Jefferson Davis may have failed to see Colonel Chandler's
report by no means implies that he was ignorant of the horrors of
Andersonville. [page 503] Cooper and Seddon received many
accounts of them and considering the relations between the three
it is incomprehensible that he should not have shared their
knowledge; moreover the one letter of the "poor man "from
Georgia is likely enough but one of many such. In truth the
suffering at Andersonville in the summer of 1864 was notorious in
the Confederacy. To parole the prisoners required an exceptional
man - a man of great magnanimity and rare foresight and these
qualities Davis did not possess. Undoubtedly his view was in
accord with Seddon's indorsement on the letter of the prominent
citizen of South Carolina. "It presents a great embarrassment,"
he wrote, "but I see no remedy which is not worse than the evil.
For the present we must hope the enemy will be constrained to
relinquish their inhuman policy of refusing exchange. We are not
responsible for the miserable sufferings of the captives and
cannot afford to release them to replenish Yankee armies and
supply Yankee laborers."(1) (1) O. R, ser. ii. vol.
vii. p. 856.
No Deliberate Confederate Policy to Maltreat Prisoners
The general opinion of officials and citizens at the North was
that the suffering and deaths at Andersonville and other prisons
was due to a deliberate policy of the Confederate government for
the decimation of the enemy's ranks, and that the words
attributed to Captain Wirz, "I'm killing more Yankees than Lee at
the front," were only an indiscreet avowal of Jefferson Davis's
wish and intent.(2)
(2) I will cite two representative statements. A
commission of inquiry appointed by the United States Sanitary
Commission consisting of three physicians, one judge, one
clergyman and one private citizen and in their report o!
September, 1864: "The conclusion is unavoidable, therefore, that
these privations and sufferings have been designedly
inflicted by the military and other authority of the rebel
government:" and cannot have been "due to cause which such
authorities could not control."-p. 95. A Committee of the
House of Representatives on the Treatment of Prisoner of War by
Rebel Authorities and in the famous Report No. 45 presented in
1869: "The opinion of the committee carefully and deliberately
formed [is) that the neglect and refusal of the rebel authorities
to provide sufficient and proper rations was the result of a
premeditated system and scheme of the confederate authorities to
reduce our ranks by starvation, and that they were not forced to
these deprivations from accident or necessity." - p. 216.
[p 504] That there is no positive evidence in support of this
opinion the search I have made enables me to affirm with
confidence;(1) and this conclusion from present investigations
receives a strong attestation from a significant fact in the
past. During 1865 and afterwards officials connected with the
executive department of the government, army officers, senators
and representatives, were eager to fasten upon Davis some direct
responsibility for the suffering of the Union prisoners of war.
With all the records at their command and with all facilities for
eliciting testimony from living witnesses they failed to bring to
light any evidence on which he might be tried by a military
commission or any acts or words which in the freer judgment of
history might leave a stain on his character. The irresistible
conclusion is that the whole case against the Confederacy lies in
bad management at the prisons, some negligence at Richmond, and
the non-adoption of a policy of mercy which few rulers would have
seriously considered. (1) Descanting on the
excellent physical condition of the Confederate and the bodily
wrecks of the Union prisoners, some Northern writers by taking a
sentence from its context and perhaps citing it as if it were a
later date have made the words of Ould the Confederate Agent of
Exchange apparently support their argument. Speaking of an
arrangement for exchange he wrote to Winder, "We get rid of a
set of miserable wretches and receive some of the best material I
ever saw." The context shows clearly that political prisoners and
their mental and moral qualities were referred to. Moreover the
date of the letter is March 17, 1863, O. R., ser. ii. vol. v. p.
853.
It is worthy of notice that Lincoln bore no part in this
controversy. Nowhere did he charge the Confederates with cruelty.
In no message to Congress, in no public or private letter did he
make a point of the alleged barbarous treatment of Northern
soldiers held captive at the South; and when Stanton proposed to
him that Confederate officers in Federal hands should [p 505] be
given the scarce rations and treatment as Union soldiers or
officers received in the Confederacy (1) Lincoln, so far as the
record shows, remained silent. That no such order was issued
implies that he did not approve of Stanton's suggestion. Lincoln
was great in his omissions as well as in his positive acts.
(1) May 5, 1864, O. R., ser. ii. vol. vii.
p.114.
Union Retaliation
In retaliation for the alleged inhuman treatment of Union
prisoners the United States War Department on April 20, 1864
reduced by about twenty per cent. the ration to the Confederate
prisoners which had hitherto been the same as the army's ration;
and on June (1) all but the sick were deprived of coffee, tea and
sugar. The difference between the reduced ration and that
furnished the soldiers in the field should constitute the
"savings" to form the "prison fund" out of which anti-scorbutic
might be purchased if the surgeon thought they were required. In
August, 1864 all supplies by gift or purchase were cut off.(2) It
is universally agreed that the reduced ration was sufficient to
preserve the health and strength of the men but on the other hand
the evidence is irrefragable that at some Northern prisons during
the year 1864 the food was insufficient and that suffering from
hunger ensued. Moreover there was more sickness, especially
scurvy, than there ought to have been with a proper application
of the prison fund. For this discrepancy the Official
Records do not account. Some embezzlement is shown but not
enough nor on a sufficiently large scale to explain why prisoners
went hungry when the government intended to furnish them an
adequate supply of food. It may be conjectured that there was bad
management connected with the distribution of the rations and
also that since retaliation had been announced as the policy of
the government in high quarters some keepers of prisons inspired
by vindictive feelings took it upon themselves to make the
threatened reprisal so far real that the Confederates should
suffer from hunger.
(2) For a while in the autumn of 1863 such supplies
of food had been forbidden but in the beginning of 1864 they were
again permitted.
[p 506] In the brutal treatment of prisoners by punishment and
shooting the two sides may be said to have offended in about the
same degree. Instances abound in the writings of the period.
Every prison had its "dead line" or what corresponded to it. This
at Andersonville was a line at a certain distance from the
stockade beyond which no prisoner could pass without being shot.
In other prisons the contrivance was similar and the plan is said
to have originated in one of the best-managed places at the
North. Certain circumstances must be borne in mind. The prisoners
were always trying to escape; the guard at the South was
deficient in numbers and discipline; and in both sections
naturally the high-spirited, brave and generous officers were not
made commandants of prisons. Such work was apt to be assigned to
the cowardly or inefficient; and excessive drinking too was often
responsible for harsh treatment of prisoners. The testimony on
both sides is that prisoners were always well treated at the
front but the difference was marked when they came into the
clutches of the stay-at-home soldiers. As the most brutal of all
jailers of the Civil War John H. Winder and Wirz have come down
to our generation. The Confederate Colonel Chandler in his famous
reports of August 5, 1864 charged Winder with gross cruelty but
commended Wirz for "untiring energy and devotion." These last
words connote probably a too favourable verdict. After the war
Wirz was tried and condemned to death by a military commission
convened at Washington and was hanged on November 10, 1865.
Winder would have met a like fate had he not died before the end
of the war. [p 509]
Statistics
The controversy has led to the
employment of incorrect statistics. Jefferson Davis, Alexander H.
Stephens and other Southern writers have taken the number of
deaths of Confederate and Union prisoners from Stanton's report
to the House of Representatives of July 19, 1866 and, joining
thereto an alleged statement of Surgeon-General Barnes of which
however there is no official record, have arrived at the result
that the mortality at the North was over three per cent. greater
than at the South.(1) If there be any evidence for this
conclusion, which is doubtful, it is entitled to no credit
whatever.
(1) Confederate Government, vol. ii. p. 607; War
between the States, vol. ii. p. 508. Stanton's report was based
on that of the commissary-general of prisoners (O. R., ser. ii.
vol. viii. pp. 946, 948), and gave the following
statistics:
Deaths of Confederate prisoners of war . . . . .26,436
Deaths of Union prisoners of war . . . . . . . 22,576
Number of Confederate prisoners of war . . . . . 220,000
Number of Union prisoners of war about . . . . . 126,950
Neither Davis nor Stephens gives these numbers of prisoners but cite
SurgeonGeneral Barnes (U.S.) as authority for the statement that
there were 220,000 Confederate and 270,000 Union prisoners of
war. Davis indicates no authority but Stephens refers to an
editorial in the National Intelligencer as his source for
Barnes's figures. I have not been able to unearth any such
statement of Barnes, and General F. C. Ainsworth advises me under
date of June 29,1903 that in official record of it has been
found. At all events the statement is incorrect.
It may be affirmed on the highest authority that while the
records of Union prisons are nearly complete those of the
Confederate are meagre: of twelve Southern prisons the War
Department has not been able to secure the "death registers" and
of five others only partial records were obtainable; hence "the
total number of deaths in Confederate prisons. . . may never be
definitely known." General F. C. Ainsworth, Chief of the Record
and Pension Office, to whom I am indebted for this information
adds:
" According to the best information now obtainable, from
both Union and Confederate records,it appears that 211,411 Union
soldiers were captured during the civil war, of which number
16,668 were paroled on the field and 30,218 died while in
captivity; and that 462,634 Confederate soldiers were captured
during that war, of which number 247,769 were paroled on the
field and 25,976 died while in captivity." (1)
Thus the mortality
was a little over 12 per cent. at the North and 15% at the South.
Taking into account the better hospitals, more skilful
physicians, the ample supply of medicines and the abundance of
food at the North and the exceptionally high death-rate at
Andersonville, Florence and Salisbury one might have expected a
greater difference, which would probably be the case were all the
deaths in the Confederacy known. Still it should be remembered
that as the Southern summer bore hardly on the Union prisoners so
did the Northern winter increase the mortality of the
Confederates as the number of deaths from pneumonia bear witness.
(1) June 29,1903.
All things considered the statistics show no reason why the
North should reproach the South. If we add to one side of the
account the refusal to exchange the prisoners and the greater
resources, and to the other the distress of the Confederacy the
balance struck will not be far from even. Certain it is that no
deliberate intention existed either in Richmond or Washington to
inflict suffering on captives more than inevitably accompanied
their confinement. Rather than to charge either section with
inhumanity it were truer to lay the burden on war, recalling in
sympathy with their import the words of Sophocles, "The man. . .
who taught Greeks how to league themselves for war in hateful
arms. . . wrought the ruin of men."
ed note: this history was written by James Ford Rhodes 100 years ago!
Rhodes' Sources
In my treatment of this subject I have been much assisted by a
paper prepared for me by D. M. Matteson of Cambridge who under my
direction made an exhaustive research in series ii. of the
Official Records; in the House Report No. 45, on the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, 40th Cong. 3d Sess.; in "Trial of Henry Wirz"; and to some extent among other authorities. For the assistance
of students I will give the references which were made for me.
primary sources are coded in green in this font
O.R. = Official Records = The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies all Series of this 125 volume collection of US and Confederate official reports are online.
O. R., series. ii. vol. i. pp. 70, 77, 88, 93, 101, 103, 168,174;
O. R. vol. ii. p. 390;
vol. iii.
pp. 5, 8, 9, 32,
47,55,121,122,126,130,131,136,142,153,157, 160, 184,191,196, 199,
211, 213, 216, 217, 221, 223, 226, 229, 242, 243, 246, 247, 248,
251, 253, 254, 260, 269, 270, 275, 287, 300, 310, 317, 324, 339,
348, 353, 355, 360, 364, 374, 375, 376, 379, 400, 402, 410, 417,
419, 422, 458, 460, 497, 507, 509,526, 553, 562, 565, 586, 610,
650, 654, 662, 663, 666, 670, 674, 691, 706, 712, 716, 746, 749,
751, 788, 789, 812, 821, 824, 855, 886, 899;
vol. iv. pp. 30, 36,
37, 45, 106,133,152, 169,174,198, 253, 255, 260, 266, 277, 278,
332, 353, 508, 545, 553, 561, 593, 600, 620, 621, 627, 677, 691,
738, 760, 777, 779, 787, 799, 822, 829, 830, 836, 857, 900 909,
913, 916, 945;
vol. v. pp. 7,10, 48, 71, 75,113,127,132,140,150,
186, 193, 213, 216, 217, 237, 239, 251, 267, 267, 281, 286, 298,
305, 320, 322, 328, 343, 361, 379, 386, 388, 391, 397, 399, 418,
431, 435, 442, 443, 449, 455, 462, 477, 508, 511, 537, 556, 587,
607, 611, 659, 674, 690, 691, 696, 698, 701, 746, 754, 768, 770,
773, 789, 796, 806, 819, 832, 838, 853, 855, 867, 919, 925, 930,
940, 953, 959, 960
vol. vi.
pp. 4,11,12,17, 21, 25, 28, 35, 45,
60, 78, 80, 82, 96,113,117,118,120 123,129,135,152,153, 181,190,
192, 209, 218, 238, 240, 241, 250, 262, 264, 267, 275, 277, 281,
282, 301, 315, 328, 330, 331, 339, 348, 353, 354, 369, 363, 364,
365, 370, 372, 374, 379, 387, 391, 392, 395, 401, 403, 408, 420,
422, 424, 426, 431, 437, 438, 439, 441, 444, 453, 459, 465, 471,
473, 475, 479, 482, 484, 485, 501, 504, 510, 516, 527, 528, 537,
552, 557, 558, 566, 569, 587, 602, 609, 625, 634, 638, 641, 642,
647, 651, 659, 663, 686, 693, 704, 711, 717, 740, 746, 748, 754,
755, 768, 769, 777, 809, 826, 843, 848, 849, 871, 878, 887, 888,
893, 900, 908, 913, 920, 921, 924, 934, 937, 938, 951, 954, 962,
968, 972, 977, 978, 985, 996, 1014, 1022,
1039,1048,1079,1087,1111,1121,1124
vol. vii. pp.15, 29, 43, 46,
51, 53, 60, 62, 63, 69, 72, 76, 78, 80, 81, 83, 84, 89,
93,104,108,111,113,117,118, 122, 130,151,172, 183, 184, 185,198,
203, 204, 205, 207, 208, 216, 222, 224, 366, 381, 386, 392, 397,
399, 400, 408, 413, 421, 438, 448, 459, 460, 465, 480, 484, 493,
495, 499, 505, 508, 512, 515, 517, 521, 533, 535, 541, 546, 557,
565, 567, 571, 573, 578, 583, 587, 604, 611, 612, 617, 673, 682,
687, 698, 705, 708, 714, 773, 782, 783, 787, 790, 791, 793, 796,
830, 837, 856, 863, 870, 872, 874, 878, 879, 906, 915, 923, 954,
955, 956, 967, 972, 976, 986, 987, 990, 996, 997, 1004,
1012,1020,1075,1078,1082, 1092,1098,1116, 1129, 1130, 1137, 1141,
1143, 1150,1159,1162,1206,1217,1219,1221,1229,1246,1248,1258;
vol. viii. pp. 19, 33, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 96, 97, 122, 137, 147,
156,161, 167, 170, 171, 175, 187, 193, 197, 211, 215, 227, 236,
270, 294, 330, 339, 355, 358, 363, 364, 376, 389, 393, 456, 529,
534, 537, 581, 585, 592, 650, 659, 665, 667, 704, 722, 730, 748,
754, 771, 811, 946, 952, 957;
in House Report No. 45, [not online; available in large university libraries, Government Documents collection] pp. 24, 25, 30, 33, 35, 42, 44, 45, 47, 51, 56, 58, 70, 71, 72, 77, 81, 82, 83, 86, 88,115, 161, 166,169, 171,172, 185, 195, 205, 208, 208, 210, 212, 217, 218, 228, 249,
250, 252, 341, 343, 774, 788, 792, 795, 797, 798, 803, 804, 807,
808, 810, 822, 824, 825, 827, 830, 831, 837, 852, 856, 857, 864,
866, 881, 899, 902, 927, 933, 945, 951, 954, 957, 964, 965, 982,
985, 991, 994, 1005, 1016, 1021, 1024, 1030, 1032, 1035, 1067,
1090,1106, 1108,1109,1143;
"The Trial of Henry Wirz," Exec. Doc., No. 23, 40th Cong. 2d
Sess., [not online; available in large university libraries, Government Documents collection] pp. 24, 30, 38, 40, 45, 50, 53, 57, 63, 83, 88, 94,
103,104, 111,133,141,144,176, 206, 209, 240, 248, 249, 254, 269,
270, 271, 273, 276, 298, 326, 330, 333, 334, 335, 363, 371, 376,
380, 386, 406, 408, 436, 458, 463, 464, 471, 473, 474, 480, 486,
487, 489, 492, 511, 644, 646, 651, 659, 666, 671, 672, 674, 751,
773.
My account is based chiefly on series ii. of the Official Records, all the references to which I read carefully. I examined a number of the references to Report No. 45 and a few to "Trial
of Henry Wirz." Besides these I read
with interest, care and satisfaction Professor Rufus B.
Richardson's article in the New Englander for Nov.
1880; and I have also read: Report of the Committee on the
Conduct of the War, Report No. 67, 38th Cong. 1st Sess.; the
article on "The Treatment of Prisoners during the War between
the States;" vol. i. (1876), Southern Historical Society Papers,
and the article "Discussion of the Prison Question," ibid., vol.
ii;
"Narrative of Privations and Sufferings of United States
Officers and Soldiers while Prisoners of War, Report of a
Committee of Inquiry appointed by the United States Sanitary
Commission" (1864);
articles of J. T. King, , Horace Carpenter, on a camp in Ohio; and "Cold Cheer at Camp Morton" by John A. Wyeth, on an Indiana camp, Century Magazine; vol. xli (1891);
reply by W. R. Holloway to Wyeth,
and Wyeth's rejoinder, Ibid., vol. xliv., and their further
discussion, ibid., vol. xliii. I have likewise consulted
Jefferson Davis's Confederate Government, vol. ii.; A. H.
Stephen's War between the States, vol. ii.; John
McElroy, Andersonville, (1879).
end of Rhodes
by Richard Jensen 4-9-2004
Write me at RJensen@uic.edu
Copyright (c) 2004. Richard Jensen. This Guide was prepared with support from the Robert H. Michel Civic Education Grants sponsored by The Dirksen Congressional Center. Scholars are invited to post the complete Guide to campus WWW sites and distribute it to students.